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Abstract—In this paper, we study the problem of physical
layer security in a large-scale multiple-input multiple-output (LS-
MIMO) relaying system. The advantage of LS-MIMO relaying
systems is exploited to enhance both wireless security and spectral
efficiency. In particular, the challenging issue incurred by short
interception distance is well addressed. Under very practical
assumptions, i.e., no eavesdropper’s channel state information
(CSI) and imperfect legitimate channel CSI, this paper gives
a thorough investigation of the impact of imperfect CSI in
two classic relaying systems, i.e., amplify-and-forward (AF) and
decode-and-forward (DF) systems, and obtain explicit expressions
of secrecy outage capacities for both cases. Finally, our theoretical
claims are validated by the numerical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
The open nature of wireless channel gives rise to many
wireless security problems. Traditionally, wireless security is
guaranteed through high layer encryption. With the develop-
ment of interception technology, encryption becomes more
complex, leading to high computation burden. Thanks to the
physical layer security measures enlightened by information
theory, we may exploit wireless channel characteristics to
guarantee secure communications [1] even without encryption.
The performance of physical layer security is measured by
secrecy rate, namely the capacity difference between the legit-
imate channel from the information source to the destination
and the eavesdropper channel from the information source to
the eavesdropper [2] [3]. As expected, the introduction of relay
into physical layer security can improve the legitimate channel
capacity through cooperative diversity, and thus enhances
transmission security [4]. Some feasible relaying schemes and
their performances were discussed in [5]. Relay positions were
then optimized from the the perspective of minimizing the
interception probability in [6]. Further, best relay selection was
proposed to suppress the interception probability by exploiting
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selective gain in multiple relay systems [7]. Additionally, mul-
tiple relay cooperative beamforming combined with jamming
was also adopted to maximize the secrecy rate [8]. In fact, if
the relay is equipped with multiple antennas, more effective
relaying strategy can be used to optimize the secrecy rate [9].
Linear precoding schemes were investigated in a MIMO relay
network assuming global CSI [10]. Nevertheless, due to the
fact that the eavesdroppers are usually well hidden, it is diffi-
cult for the relay to obtain the knowledge of the eavesdropper
channel. Therefore, it is difficult to realize absolutely secure
communications over the fading channel. Under this condition,
the conception of secrecy outage capacity was adopted to
guarantee a secure communication with a high probability [11]
[12].
A challenging problem rises when the eavesdropper is close
to the information transmitter. Even with a multi-antenna relay,
the secrecy outage capacity is too small to fulfill the require-
ment of quality of service (QoS), due to the relatively high
quality of intercepted signal. Recently, it is found that large-
scale MIMO (LS-MIMO) systems can significantly improve
the transmission performance by utilizing its enormous array
gain [13] [14]. Inspired by this, we propose the use of an LS-
MIMO relay to enhance wireless security. Note that a critical
issue of the LS-MIMO system is that channel state information
(CSI) may be imperfect due to duplex delay in time division
duplex (TDD) systems, resulting in inevitable performance
loss. In this paper, we focus on the performance analysis in
terms of secrecy outage capacity in an LS-MIMO relay system
with imperfect CSI under the amplify-to-forward (AF) and the
decode-to-forward (DF) relaying strategies, respectively. The
contributions of this paper are two-fold:
1) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
introduce LS-MIMO into a relay system, and solve the
challenging problem of short-distance interception.
2) We derive explicit expressions of secrecy outage capac-
ity for AF and DF relaying systems, and then provide
some guidelines for performance optimization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first
give an overview of the LS-MIMO relaying system employing
physical layer security in Section II, and then derive the
secrecy outage capacities based on AF and DF relaying
strategies with imperfect CSI in Section III. In Section IV, we
present some numerical results to validate the effectiveness of
the proposed scheme. Finally, we conclude the whole paper
in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
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Fig. 1. An overview of the large-scale MIMO relaying system employing
physical layer security.
We consider a time division duplex (TDD) LS-MIMO re-
laying system, including one source, one destination equipped
with a single antenna each and one relay deploying NR anten-
nas in presence of a passive single antenna eavesdropper, as
shown in Fig.1. It is worth pointing out that NR is usually quite
large in such an LS-MIMO relaying system, i.e. NR = 100
or greater. The system works in the half-duplex mode, so the
information transmission from the source to the destination
via the aid of the relay requires two time slots. Specifically,
in the first time slot, the source transmits the signal to the
relay, and then the relay forwards the post-processing signal
to the destination during the second time slot. Note that the
direct link from the source to the destination is unavailable
due to long distance. Meanwhile, the eavesdropper monitors
the transmission from the relay to the destination, and tries to
intercept the signal. Following [7], we also assume that the
eavesdropper is out of the coverage area of the source, since
it thought the information comes from the relay.
We use √αi,jhi,j to denote the channel from i to j,
where i ∈ {S,R}, j ∈ {R,D,E} and S,R,D,E represent
the source, the relay, the destination and the eavesdropper,
respectively. αi,j is the distance-dependent path loss and hi,j
is the channel small scale fading. In this paper, we model hi,j
as Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance.
αi,j remains constant during a relatively long period and hi,j
fades independently slot by slot. Thus, the receive signals at
the relay in the first time slot can be expressed as
yR =
√
PSαS,RhS,Rs+ nR, (1)
where s is the normalized Gaussian distributed transmit signal,
PS is the transmit power at the source, nR is the additive
Gaussian white noise with zero mean and unit variance at the
relay. Through post-processing to yR according to the CSI
hS,R and hR,D, the relay forwards a normalized signal r to
the destination with power PR, then the received signals at the
destination and the eavesdropper are given by
yD =
√
PRαR,DhHR,Dr + nD, (2)
and
yE =
√
PRαR,EhHR,Er + nE , (3)
respectively, where nD and nE are the additive Gaussian white
noises with zero mean and unit variance at the destination and
the eavesdropper.
Assuming the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper
channel capacities are CD and CE , from the perspective of
information theory, the secrecy capacity is given by CSEC =
[CD − CE ]+, where [x]+ = max(x, 0) [2]. Since there is
no knowledge of the eavesdropper channel at the source and
relay, it is impossible to provide a steady secrecy capacity.
In this paper, we take the secrecy outage capacity CSOC as
the performance metric, which is defined as the maximum
rate under the condition that the outage probability that the
transmission rate surpasses the secrecy capacity is equal to a
given value ε, namely
Pr(CSOC > CD − CE) = ε. (4)
III. SECRECY OUTAGE CAPACITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we concentrate on the analysis of secrecy
outage capacity of physical layer security in an LS-MIMO re-
laying system. Considering that AF and DF are two commonly
used relaying strategies, we study the two cases in sequence.
A. Amplify-and-Forward (AF) Case
In this case, the relay forwards the signal rAF via multiply-
ing the received signal yR by a NR ×NR processing matrix
F, namely
rAF = FyR. (5)
We assume the relay has full CSI hS,R by channel estimation,
and gets partial CSI hR,D by via channel reciprocity in TDD
systems. Due to duplex delay between uplink and downlink,
there is a certain degree of mismatch between the estimated
CSI hˆR,D and the real CSI hR,D, whose relation can be
expressed as [15]
hR,D =
√
ρhˆR,D +
√
1− ρe, (6)
where e is the error noise vector with independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero mean and unit variance
complex Gaussian entries. ρ, scaling from 0 to 1, is the
correlation coefficient between hˆR,D and hR,D. A large ρ
means better CSI accuracy. If ρ = 1, the relay has full
CSI hR,D. Additionally, due to the hidden property of the
eavesdropper, the CSI hR,E is unavailable. Therefore, F is
designed only based on hS,R and hˆR,D, but is independent of
hR,E . Considering the better performance of maximum ratio
combination (MRC) and maximum ratio transmission (MRT)
in LS-MIMO systems, we design F by combining MRC and
MRT. Specifically, the received signal yR is combined with an
MRC vector h
H
S,R
‖hS,R‖ , and then normalized by a scaling factor
1√
PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2+1
, and finally multiplied by an MRT vector
hˆR,D
‖hˆR,D‖
. In other words, the processing matrix is given by
F = hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
1√
PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2 + 1
hHS,R
‖hS,R‖ . (7)
Thus, the received signal at the destination and the correspond-
ing signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) can be expressed as
yAFD =
√
PSPRαS,RαR,DhHR,DhˆR,DhHS,RhS,R
‖hˆR,D‖
√
PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2 + 1‖hS,R‖
s
+
√
PRαR,DhHR,DhˆR,DhHS,R
‖hˆR,D‖
√
PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2 + 1‖hS,R‖
nR + nD,
(8)
and
γAFD =
PSPRαS,RαR,D |hHR,D hˆR,D|
2‖hS,R‖2
‖hˆR,D‖2(PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2+1)
PRαR,D |hHR,D hˆR,D |2
‖hˆR,D‖2(PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2+1)
+ 1
=
a|hHR,DhˆR,D|2‖hS,R‖2
b|hHR,DhˆR,D|2 + ‖hˆR,D‖2(c‖hS,R‖2 + 1)
, (9)
where a = PSPRαS,RαR,D, b = PRαR,D and c = PSαS,R.
Based on the receive SNR in (9), we have the following
theorem:
Theorem 1: The legitimate channel capacity in an LS-MIMO
relaying system in presence of imperfect CSI can be approx-
imated as CAFD = W log2
(
1 +
PSPRαS,RαR,DρN
2
R
PRαR,DρNR+PSαS,RNR+1
)
,
where W is the spectral bandwidth.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix I.
It is found that the legitimate channel capacity is a constant
due to channel hardening in such an LS-MIMO relaying
system. Similar to (9), the SNR at the eavesdropper is given
by
γAFE =
d|hHR,E hˆR,D|2‖hS,R‖2
e|hHR,E hˆR,D|2 + ‖hˆR,D‖2(c‖hS,R‖2 + 1)
, (10)
where d = PSPRαS,RαR,E and e = PRαR,E . Hence,
according to the definition of secrecy outage capacity in (4),
we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2: Given the outage probability bound by ε, the
secrecy outage capacity based on the AF relaying strategy is
CAFSOC = C
AF
D −W log2
(
1 + dNR ln εe ln ε−cNR−1
)
.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix II.
Based on Theorem 2, we may obtain the interception proba-
bility PAF0 , namely the probability that the legitimated channel
capacity is less than the eavesdropper channel capacity. By
letting CAFSOC = 0 in (20), we have
PAF0 = 1− F
(
2C
AF
D /W − 1
)
= exp

− (cNR + 1)
(
2C
AF
D /W − 1
)
dNR − e
(
2CD/W − 1)

 . (11)
B. Decode-and-Forward (DF) Case
Different from the AF relaying strategy, the DF decodes
the receive signal at the relay, and then forwards the original
signal to the destination, so as to avoid noise amplification.
Also by using the MRC technique at the relay, the channel
capacity from the source to the relay can be expressed as
CDFS,R = W log2(1 + PSαS,R‖hS,R‖2)
= W log2(1 + PSαS,RNR), (12)
where (12) holds true based on channel hardening when NR →
∞. Then, the relay performs MRT based on the estimated CSI
hˆR,D. The channel capacity from the relay to the destination
is given by
CDFR,D = W log2

1 + PRαR,D
∣∣∣∣∣hHR,D hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2


≈ W log2 (1 + PRαR,DρNR) , (13)
where (13) is obtained similarly to Theorem 1. Thus, the
legitimate channel capacity under the DF relaying strategy can
be expressed as
CDFD = min(C
DF
S,R , C
DF
R,D)
= W log2 (1 + min(PSαS,RNR, PRαR,DρNR)) .
(14)
It is found that CDFD is also a constant due to channel hard-
ening in an LS-MIMO system. Meanwhile, the eavesdropper
intercepts the signal from the relay, the corresponding channel
capacity can be computed as
CDFE = W log2

1 + PRαR,E
∣∣∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,E‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 . (15)
For the secrecy outage capacity in an LS-MIMO DF relaying
system, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3: Given the outage probability bound by ε, the
secrecy outage capacity based on the DF relaying strategy is
CDFSOC = C
DF
D −W log2 (1 + PRαR,E ln ε).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix III.
Similarly, we can also obtain the interception probability in
this case. Let CDFSOC = 0 in (25), we have
PDF0 = exp
(
−2
CDFD /W − 1
PRαR,E
)
. (16)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To examine the accuracy of the derived theoretical expres-
sions of the secrecy outage capacity for the LS-MIMO AF
and DF relaying systems, we present several numerical results
in the following scenarios: we set NR = 100, W = 10KHz
and ρ = 0.9. The relay is in the middle of a line between
the source and the destination. We normalize the path loss
as αS,R = αR,D = 1 and use αR,E to denote the relative
path loss. For example, if αR,E > 1, then the eavesdropper
is closer to the relay than the destination. In addition, we use
SNRS = 10 log10 PS and SNRR = 10 log10 PR to represent
the transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in dB at the source
and the relay, respectively.
Firstly, we testify the accuracy of the theoretical expression
in AF relaying mode with SNRs =SNRR = 20dB. As seen
in Fig.2, the theoretical results are well consistent with the
simulations in the whole αR,E region with different outage
probability requirements, which proves the high accuracy
of the derived performance expressions. Given the outage
probability bound by ε, as αR,E increases, the secrecy outage
capacity decreases gradually, this is because the interception
ability of the eavesdropper enhances due to the short inter-
ception distance. In addition, given αR,E , the secrecy outage
capacity improves with the increase of ε, since the outage
probability is an increasing function of the secrecy outage
capacity.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of theoretical and simulation results based on AF relaying
mode.
Secondly, we show the impact of SNRR on the secrecy
outage capacity in AF relaying mode with ε = 0.01, αR,E =
1, and SNRS = 20dB. As seen in Fig.3, the secrecy outage
capacity is not an increasing function of SNRR, since both
the legitimate and eavesdropper channel capacities improve
as SNRR. Thus, it makes sense to find the optimal SNRR to
maximize the secrecy outage capacity in LS-MIMO relaying
systems.
Thirdly, we investigate the impact of ρ on the secrecy outage
capacity in AF relaying mode with SNRs =SNRR = 20dB
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Fig. 3. Performance comparison based on AF relaying mode with different
SNRR.
and ε = 0.01. The CSI mismatch will result in the performance
loss. However, in LS-MIMO relay systems, when the number
of antennas is quite large, the impact of CSI mismatch can be
weakened due to high spatial resolution. As shown in Fig.4,
the performance loss by reducing ρ from 1 to 0.8 is slight. In
other words, the AF relaying scheme is insensitive to the CSI
accuracy.
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Fig. 4. Performance comparison based on AF relaying mode with different
ρ.
Then, we testify the accuracy of the derived theoretical
expressions based on DF relaying mode with SNRs =SNRR =
20dB. As seen in Fig.5, the theoretical results coincide with
the simulations nicely. Similar to the AF relaying mode, the
secrecy outage capacity decreases as αR,E increases and ε
reduces. Note that, compared to the secrecy outage capacity
of AF relaying mode in Fig.2, the secrecy outage capacity of
DF relaying mode is better under the same conditions, since
the DF mode avoids amplifying the noise at the relay.
Next, we investigate the impact of SNRR of the secrecy
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Fig. 5. Comparison of theoretical and simulation results based on DF relaying
mode.
outage capacity in DF relaying mode with ε = 0.01, αR,E =
1, and SNRS = 20dB. From Fig.6, as SNRR increases,
unexpectedly the secrecy outage capacity decreases. This is
because the legitimate channel capacity is independent of
SNRR when SNRR is large, but the eavesdropper channel
capacity is an increasing function of SNRR. Hence, it is
also necessary to choose an optimal SNRR to optimize the
performance.
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Fig. 6. Performance comparison based on DF relaying mode with different
SNRR.
Finally, we show the impact of ρ on the interception proba-
bility based on DF relaying mode with SNRs =SNRR = 20dB
and ε = 0.01. As seen in Fig.7, although the interception
probability increases as ρ decreases, the performance gap
is nearly negligible, so the DF relaying scheme has high
robustness.
V. CONCLUSION
A major contribution of this paper is the introduction of
the LS-MIMO relaying technique into physical layer security
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different ρ.
to significantly enhance wireless security, especially when
the interception distance is short. This paper focuses on the
analysis of secrecy outage capacity under the AF and DF
relaying strategies, and derives the closed-form expressions
in terms of the transmit SNR and the channel condition.
Altogether, these results provide some important guidelines
for performance optimization of physical layer security in LS-
MIMO relaying systems.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Based on the SNR γAFD at the destination, the legitimated
channel capacity can be expressed as
CAFD = W log2(1 + a|hHR,DhˆR,D|2‖hS,R‖2
/ (b|hHR,DhˆR,D|2 + ‖hˆR,D‖2(c‖hS,R‖2 + 1)))
= W log2
(
1 + a
∣∣∣∣∣(√ρhˆR,D +
√
1− ρe)H hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
∗ ‖hS,R‖2/
(
b
∣∣∣∣∣(√ρhˆR,D +
√
1− ρe)H hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ (c‖hS,R‖2 + 1)
))
(17)
= W log2
(
1 + a(ρ‖hˆR,D‖2 + 2
√
ρ(1− ρ)R(eH hˆR,D)
+ (1− ρ)‖ehˆHR,D‖2/‖hˆR,D‖2)‖hS,R‖2/(b(ρ‖hˆR,D‖2
+ 2
√
ρ(1− ρ)R(eH hˆR,D) + (1 − ρ)‖ehˆHR,D‖2/‖hˆR,D‖2)
+ (c‖hS,R‖2 + 1)
))
≈ W log2
(
1 +
aρ‖hˆR,D‖2‖hS,R‖2
bρ‖hˆR,D‖2 + c‖hS,R‖2 + 1
)
(18)
≈ W log2
(
1 +
aρN2R
bρNR + cNR + 1
)
, (19)
where R(x) denotes the real part of x. hR,D is replaced by√
ρhˆR,D +
√
1− ρe in (17). (18) follows from the fact that
ρ‖hˆR,D‖2 scales with the order Θ(ρNR) as NR → ∞ while
2
√
ρ(1− ρ)R(eH hˆR,D) + (1 − ρ)‖ehˆHR,D‖2/‖hˆR,D‖2 scales
as the order O(1), which can be negligible. (19) holds true be-
cause of lim
NR→∞
‖hˆR,D‖2
NR
= 1 and lim
NR→∞
‖hS,R‖2
NR
= 1, namely
channel hardening [16]. Therefore, we get the Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to (4), given ε, we have
ε = Pr
(
CAFSOC > C
AF
D −W log2(1 + γAFE )
)
= Pr
(
γAFE > 2
(CAFD −C
AF
SOC)/W − 1
)
= 1− F
(
2(C
AF
D −C
AF
SOC)/W − 1
)
, (20)
where F (x) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of
γAFE . In order to derive the secrecy outage capacity, the key
is to get the cdf of γAFE . Examining (10), due to channel
hardening, we have
γAFE =
dNR
∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2
e
∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2 + cNR + 1 . (21)
Since hˆR,D/‖hˆR,D‖ is an isotropic unit vector and indepen-
dent of hR,E ,
∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,D/‖hˆR,D‖∣∣∣2 is χ2 distributed with 2
degrees of freedom. Let y ∼ χ22, we can derive the cdf of γAFE
as
F (x) = Pr
(
dNRy
ey + cNR + 1
≤ x
)
. (22)
If x < dNR/e, then we have
F (x) = Pr
(
y ≤ (cNR + 1)x
dNR − ex
)
= 1− exp
(
− (cNR + 1)x
dNR − ex
)
. (23)
Since x ≥ NR/e is impossible when x = 2(C
AF
D −C
AF
SOC)/W −
1, we have
ε = exp

(cNR + 1)
(
2(C
AF
D −C
AF
SOC)/W − 1
)
dNR − e
(
2(C
AF
D
−CAF
SOC)/W − 1
)

 . (24)
Hence, we get the Theorem 2.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Similarly, according to the definition of secrecy outage
capacity in (4), we have
ε = Pr(C
DF
SOC > C
DF
D − CDFE )
= Pr


∣∣∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,E‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
>
2(C
DF
D −C
DF
SOC)/W − 1
PRαR,E


= exp
(
−2
(CDFD −C
DF
SOC)/W − 1
PRαR,E
)
, (25)
where (25) follows the fact that
∣∣∣hHR,E hˆR,E‖hˆR,D‖
∣∣∣2 is χ2 dis-
tributed with 2 degrees of freedom as analyzed earlier. Based
on (25), it is easy to get the Theorem 3.
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